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Although religious freedom has the distinction as the “first 
freedom,” it is not first in terms of protected rights.  Religious 
freedom is under attack and if not shielded from potential threats, 
this quintessential American right may be lost altogether.  Or at 
least, this is what U.S. law professors Andrew Koppelman and 
Steven D. Smith would have one believe, according to books each 
professor recently published.  Unfortunately, they are not 
exaggerating.  Volumes of articles and tomes have been written 
questioning, critiquing and criticizing (and lamenting, blasting and 
ridiculing) the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicating the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment, in general, and the 
Establishment Clause, in particular.  The Court’s jurisprudence in 
this regard has been called everything from “unprincipled” to “a 
disaster” to “an unholy mess.”1  The frustration with the Court in 
this area is not limited to the legal academy.  It has spilled over into 
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public discourse as well, with discussions in social media and op-
ed pieces nationwide, by experts, journalists, and the average citizen 
alike. 
The most recent chapter in a long history of jurisprudential 
incoherence occurred last year when the Court decided the Town of 
Greece v. Galloway2 case.  In holding that prayer conducted as part 
of legislative sessions at any level of government was 
constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause, the 
Court issued five different opinions, advancing seven different 
theories in support of or against the decision.  No theory received 
clear consensus.  The town may have won the case, but many 
wondered if all Americans lost in the long run because of such a 
divisive decision by the Court.  One of the central premises of the 
rule of law that shapes American society is stability and 
predictability.  Many questioned whether the Court was eroding the 
rule of law—not by the decision it made, but by the multitude of 
theories it advanced for that decision. 
The problem of instability and unpredictability may seem 
interesting from an intellectual standpoint—one that is fun to debate 
with colleagues and friends in a casual setting or in the comment 
section of a blog—but not a problem affecting the daily life of 
Americans.  This is a short-sighted perspective, however.  The 
inability for the Court to advance a coherent approach to the religion 
clauses leaves many areas of American society vulnerable to attack. 
For instance, the ability of religious organizations to govern their 
internal affairs without government interference, the ability of 
religious people to advance their religion openly through the 
enactment of laws, and the ability of religious people to practice 
their religion by not providing the services associated with same-
sex marriage are all areas affected by the Court’s decision-making 
with respect to the religion clauses. 
Given the importance of Supreme Court decisions over 
Americans’ daily lives, it is time for the Court to develop a 
consistent approach to Establishment Clause issues.  Professors 
Koppelman and Smith each argue for a particular approach to 
address this quagmire.  Each approach has merits.  However, Smith 
offers the better argument as his theory provides a path forward for 
the Supreme Court using a method of adjudication the Court 
practiced prior to the mid-twentieth century.  Koppelman’s theory 
2. 572 U.S. __ , 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).
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has good substantive points and is attractive in terms of public 
discourse and law-making; however, it is premised on a somewhat 
flawed understanding of American history and is not developed 
enough to have practical importance. 
According to Koppelman, religion is good (or, alternatively, a 
distinctive human good) and is therefore worthy of protection.  
American law has always offered protection to religion, according 
to Koppelman, by using the principle of neutrality.  This good is 
under attack by “religious traditionalists” who believe neutrality is 
a fraud because the law necessarily involves substantive 
commitments, for every action has a normative component.  The 
law does not go far enough in allowing religion in the public square. 
At the other end of the spectrum are “radical secularists” who view 
neutrality as flawed because it does not totally eradicate religion 
from the public square.  Koppelman believes that both camps have 
an incomplete understanding of the character of neutrality, and once 
properly understood, they will both see the merits of neutrality and 
adopt it accordingly.  The essence of neutrality, says Koppelman, is 
the inability of government to declare religious truth, which is to 
take a position on a live religious debate.  The government may not 
declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one or enact 
laws that clearly imply such a declaration.  According to 
Koppelman, government can treat religion (defined at a high 
enough abstraction) as a good thing without deciding any issue of 
religious truth.  The government should adopt this neutrality 
because it has the following advantages: 1) reduces civil strife 
caused by religious debate; 2) protects religion from corruption by 
government manipulation; 3) ensures that religious minorities are 
not oppressed; and 4) removes the government from an area of law-
making in which it has no competence.  The advantage of neutrality 
is its fluidity.  It looks different depending on a particular time and 
circumstance.  For this reason, neutrality in early America took the 
form of a generic Protestantism.  Now, given the change in 
demographics and the rise of religious plurality, neutrality includes 
a broad definition of religion, one that can include a nonsectarian 
morality not based on “religion.” 
Koppleman notes the neutrality doctrine in Supreme Court 
cases, beginning with the pivotal Everson v. Board of Education3 
case of 1947, declaring the principle that the Establishment Clause 
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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is applicable to the states and not just the federal government (the 
incorporation principle), and the prohibition of government 
monetary aid in support of religion.  In tracing the development of 
neutrality in American case law, he notes the development of the 
secular purpose test, where the Court considers whether a law on its 
face and as applied has a secular purpose, and not just a religious 
one.  He supports this test because it maintains true neutrality–it 
ensures government is not declaring a religious truth.  Removing 
this test would leave people vulnerable to violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as historically many laws were enacted on 
religious grounds. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is in disarray, according to 
Koppelman, because some scholars and justices want to abandon 
neutrality (and by extension the secular purpose test) and instead 
adopt an approach where the government accepts and promotes 
religion (usually in a monotheistic form).  This group adopts the 
traditionalists’ belief that the state needs religion to provide real 
goods and moral resources, and therefore the government must rely 
upon and promote a contestable set of ideals, making neutrality 
impossible.  This approach to reject neutrality and permit states to 
favor monotheistic religion over its rivals (an approach attributed to 
Justice Antonin Scalia) is, for Koppelman, a return to older, more 
primitive tendencies in American law and not a good development. 
He believes neutrality is the path forward.  There is no need to go 
back. 
Professor Smith’s thesis centers on neutrality as well, but with 
a different meaning and outcome.  Smith defines the essence of 
religious freedom as the freedom of the church and freedom of 
conscience (the “inner church”).  He traces the American story 
surrounding these freedoms not to the venerated founders but to 
Christianity’s early history during pagan Rome and its continued 
ascension in medieval Europe.  He notes that the Enlightenment 
period did not define these concepts, as customarily believed, but 
was instead a conduit for Christianity in that it embraced the spirit 
of tolerance found in paganism, which in turn protected both the 
freedom of the church and conscience.  This continued onto the 
American shores, where the founders instituted the Bill of Rights—
not as a transformative expression of new rights, but as an attempt 
to maintain the status quo.  The new national government would not 
enact laws affecting religion, preferring instead to leave such 
matters at the state level.  The national government was thought to 
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lack jurisdiction over matters of religion and so the Bill of Rights 
made explicit what was already understood.  Over time, as 
consensus built in support of the separation of church and state (due 
to the increase in religious pluralism), the First Amendment was 
seen to enshrine the idea of disestablishment of religion from the 
government.  In this manner, the amendment transitioned from a 
statement on the jurisdiction of the national government to an 
affirmative commitment of the government to maintain a separation 
of church and state. 
The golden age of religious liberty according to Smith was the 
time before Everson was decided when there was an “open 
contestation” between “providentialists,” who believe government 
should support one religion (Christianity) and allow others to grow, 
and “secularists,” who believe the government should remain 
detached and neutral towards religion.  During this open 
contestation, government did not take a position between the two 
sides.  Instead, the disagreements between the two sides were 
preserved and protected with both sides being constitutionally 
legitimate.  Smith calls this period the “American settlement.”  
Cases were decided upon the set of understandings defining the 
country at a particular moment, called soft constitutional law. 
Under this regime, constitutional questions can be argued and 
different states and localities reach their own conclusions.  
Government does not take a position.  Smith likens it to the 
marketplace of ideas in freedom of speech doctrine and the two-
party system in politics.  Each side is allowed to persuade citizens 
to adopt a particular perspective and law, which will usually result 
in cooperation between the two sides producing compromise.  The 
nature of the Constitution itself enshrines this ideal.  According to 
Smith, it is neither providentialist nor secularist, theist nor atheist. 
This preserves unity amid diversity. 
The American settlement is preferable to hard constitutional 
law where the Supreme Court adjudicates cases based on supporting 
one of the positions.  This is exactly what happened beginning in 
Everson and continuing into the twenty-first century.  The Supreme 
Court adopted secular neutrality, supporting the secularists, and 
refined the doctrine throughout the decades by adopting and 
revising various tests to apply to cases.  Smith notes that although 
the Court has used a variety of principles for religious clause cases, 
neutrality was the predominant one. 
Smith’s problem with this approach lies in the nature of 
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neutrality and the outcome of using it.  Genuine neutrality is 
impossible.  It rests on a spurious promise, an illusion.  According 
to Smith, it exists relative to a baseline but the baseline can never 
truly be neutral.  Speaking and acting says something–it stakes a 
claim.  Bias is inevitable.  Further, the neutrality doctrine has 
created a divisive dynamic.  The secularists have been declared 
constitutionally valid while the providentialists are declared 
constitutional heretics.  They can both feel like outsiders, leading to 
alienation: the providentialists because they are no longer able to 
speak in religious language and must adopt the secular dialect 
(which can be superficial and weak) and the secularists because they 
will feel betrayed by a de facto establishment of religion since all 
traces of religion have not been, and will not be, removed from the 
public square (e.g. religious language allowed in the motto, pledge, 
and currency.). 
For Smith, there is cause for concern.  Besides the pressure to 
adopt secular neutrality, the ideal of equality threatens to dismantle 
religious freedom all together.  Because of various cultural forces, 
equality is pitted against religious freedom.  The insistence that all 
are free and worthy of equal rights has translated into denying 
religion and religious people any special consideration.  At a 
fundamental level, the traditional religionist is incompatible with 
the egalitarian because they are built on differing orthodoxies. 
But Smith also has cause for hope.  Because of the Supreme 
Court’s erratic enforcement of the First Amendment, no side is 
losing all of the time.  Following this logic, it would seem that if 
both sides have cause for complaint, then no group is truly 
ascendant.  Smith notes that the future of religious liberty depends 
upon the fortunes of the church: if it remains a vital part of society, 
religious freedom will continue.  If, however, it succumbs to the 
forces of secularity and equality, it will collapse. 
There are a few areas of overlap between Koppelman and 
Smith.  The first is methodology and the second is substantive.  As 
to methodology, both use the same analytical approach in advancing 
their theories.  Each starts with a claim or story and, in true law 
professor style, presents an argument against such claim.  For 
Koppelman, it is the claim that neutrality is incoherent and produces 
bad results. Instead, he writes to defend neutrality. For Smith, it is 
the standard story of American religious freedom, created by myth 
and half-truths.  Smith wants to present an accurate picture of 
American religious freedom, and that includes acknowledging the 
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ebb and flow of the salience of certain principles.  Each presents 
their response as one-half of a dialogue–a conversation in which the 
audience (the reader) may or may not have prior knowledge.  Also, 
the authors are true professors in that they engage with the other’s 
works (current and prior).  Koppelman notes Smith’s view that 
neutrality by its nature is biased as the government expressly or 
tacitly either supports or denies religious belief.4  Smith notes 
Koppelman’s defense of neutrality and counters that, even with the 
fluidity of neutrality, there will still be bias in the baseline chosen.5  
He claims that with neutrality, Koppelman is not providing a 
principle but instead a label to put on specific conclusions reached 
on other grounds (he even goes so far as to imply Koppelman would 
agree with him).6  Finally, both analyze prior Supreme Court cases 
(albeit different ones) to support the conclusion that the Court has 
adopted the neutrality approach.7  They part ways on whether this 
is a good development and whether it should be maintained. 
As for substance, both confirm the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause–the prohibition on government to establish a 
national church.  It is interesting that they both use the same work 
by Donald Drakeman to support this conclusion.8  What is even 
more interesting, however, is Smith’s (friendly) amendment to 
Drakeman’s proposition.9  Smith notes that the prohibition was not 
just on establishing a religion, but also on anything that respects 
religion, so that it covers collecting taxes from the public to support 
the church, the licensing of ministers, and the like.  It went beyond 
building a national church.10  Further, both professors base their 
theories on conflict between two groups, and the nature of these 
groups is the same for each author—those  who would allow and 
protect monotheism in law while tolerating other religions 
(providentialists/traditionalists) and those who would remove 
religion from law and the public square (secularists).  They both 
4. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 
92 (2013). 
5. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 135-36 (2014). 
6. Id.
7. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 84-90; SMITH, supra note 5, at 113-20.
8. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 82-84; SMITH, supra note 5, at 57-58 (both 
referencing DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT  
(2010)). 
9. SMITH, supra note 5, at 59-60.
10. Id.
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note that each group has roots since the American founding and can 
support their claims through historical documents.  It is not 
surprising that they both identify these groups, given the existence 
of the culture wars and the polarizing nature of politics and public 
discourse currently roiling through the country.  It is helpful, 
however, to have both professors acknowledge this division and 
provide support that these divisions have existed for decades.  Here, 
again, they use the same source to evidence a part of their theory—
they both refer to Justice Scalia’s “atavistic” approach as 
representative of the providentialist/traditionalist perspective.11 
The key difference between the two authors is their vision for 
the role of the Supreme Court.  One views the Court as referee in a 
boxing match between two, and equally valid, conceptions of 
constitutional law, while the other views the Court as a coach for 
one of the boxers.  In the open contestation between providentialists 
and secularists, Smith is ambivalent as to which side should win. 
His theory suggests that each will fight with the tools available in a 
democracy (speech, association, political discourse, and the like) 
and either there will be a compromise (draw) or one will dominate 
(a knock-out).  The Court is the referee ensuring the fight is 
conducted fairly and abides by the proper rules.  Koppelman, on the 
other hand, sides with the secularists.  While he is not as radical in 
insisting upon the total removal of religion from public and for 
denying any special consideration to religion (he advocates a 
balancing approach when dealing with accommodations),12 he 
believes that religious justification for any law or policy is not 
acceptable.  In this way, he advocates for the Court to side with the 
secularists and counsel them on their approach to neutrality by 
maintaining the secular purpose test in order to best their 
opponent—the traditionalist viewpoint. 
The practical effect of both approaches is alienation. 
Koppelman does not seem to be as concerned about this effect as 
Smith.  Koppelman says that alienation, or one not getting what they 
want, is part of the political process.  There will always be winners 
and losers.  It is not clear why law should be more concerned with 
religious losers than other political losers.  Smith, however, sees 
alienation as the possible death knell to religious freedom and 
results when the Court no longer plays the referee.  Once the 
11. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 39-42; SMITH, supra note 6, at 91.
12. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
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government chooses neutrality, religious adherents are no longer 
able to be full participants in the public discourse and law-making, 
and religion will no longer be given special consideration.  Were 
this to happen, the vitality of religion (and the power of the church) 
will begin to wane leading to the evaporation of religious freedom. 
Koppelman is concerned with protecting the abstract good of 
religion by prohibiting government speaking on religious truth, 
while Smith is concerned with the practical effect on religious 
people and institutions. 
When considering a path forward, Smith has the better 
argument.  First, his theory is supported by a more credible reading 
of American history.  Using historical documents, along with the 
expertise of historians and scholars, he aptly demonstrates that the 
drafting of the First Amendment was not a momentous movement, 
but a retrieval of themes posited by pagans during medieval times. 
Smith is methodical in his approach, which makes him credible and 
his theory attractive.  Koppelman’s analysis of history is not as 
clear.  He makes sweeping statements that are unsupported by facts 
and then provides a more balanced, nuanced discussion.  For 
instance, he states that the framers believed religion corrupted 
government.13  To be sure, this is partially true—some framers did 
believe this.  But there were a host of others who did not.  Further, 
even some of those that believed this still supported government 
expression of religion.  Koppelman also states neutrality has always 
been part of American history, but then notes the ways the law was 
not entirely neutral in early America.14  He also states that everyone 
supports giving accommodations to religious believers15 (surely 
this is not true as demonstrated by the number of lawsuits on this 
issue), and then provides a detailed discussion of the different 
considerations and arguments surrounding accommodations.16  
Most people agree that the history of America at its founding and 
the subsequent development of constitutional principles is 
complicated and nuanced..  Koppelman’s broader statements miss 
this nuance and accordingly reduce his persuasive credibility.  
Furthermore, Smith’s theory is attractive because he avoids 
making any normative claim on religion or the role of religion in 
society.  The idea of religion is controversial and contestable in 
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 26-42.
15. Id. at 11, 107. 
16. Id. at 98-117.
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modern society.  Smith shows that one need not wade into the 
waters of this age-old conflict in order to adopt a coherent theory on 
religious liberty.  In fact, Koppelman exemplifies the problems that 
occur when making claims about the nature of religion.  One of the 
major problems with Koppelman’s work is the shifting description 
of religion.  At times he says religion is “good.”17  Other times, he 
says religion is a “distinctive human good.”18  These are two very 
different concepts.  The idea that religion is good is contestable and 
has been for some time.  A theory based on this premise will 
automatically be unsatisfactory for those who do not believe 
religion is good, or worse, believe that religion is a societal evil.  In 
this case, there is no need to protect or preserve something that is 
detrimental for society.  On the other hand, even those who are not 
religious or believe that religion is not good, can accept religion as 
a good–one method for humans to use to achieve the good life. 
Some may not want religion in the public square, but would not 
want to prohibit their fellow citizen from practicing religion in 
private or in limited circumstances.  They might be persuaded to 
believe in the benefits of neutrality to protect religion.  The 
inconsistent use of religion as good/a good further confuses 
Koppelman’s theory and weakens his central thesis. 
Because Smith’s work leans more toward the descriptive side 
and is less normative, his argument that the Court should return to 
the time when government had no jurisdiction over religious matter 
is persuasive.  He notes that it is a stronger claim to say government 
has no jurisdiction over religious matter, rather than say government 
ought to do or ought not to do a certain action.  Again, Koppelman 
is a useful foil.  Of the four reasons Koppelman gives for supporting 
neutrality, three are normative—government ought to protect the 
good of religion from corruption; government ought to protect the 
civil peace; and government ought to protect religious minorities.  
If one disagrees with these central premises (and there is plenty of 
reasonable disagreement), then his theory becomes less persuasive.  
Further, it is not clear why government ought to do these things and 
not others.  The fourth reason is the same as Smith’s jurisdiction 
argument.  Government lacks the competence to decide matters of 
religion and law.  The Court should remove religious issues 
completely from government’s purview and let the people decide 
17. Id. at 2, 20, 49, 107, 120.
18. Id. at 11, 15, and generally, ch. 4.
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for themselves. 
The final reason Smith’s arguments are more persuasive is less 
substantive and more stylistic.  Smith’s prose is easily accessible by 
any reader, constitutional scholar or average person.  His style is 
conversational, open and friendly.  He presents each side and 
supports the best argument with a balanced approach.  He 
acknowledges that he is oversimplifying complicated and complex 
concepts.  This is extremely beneficial, however.  Since the reader 
is joining a conversation each author is having within a larger 
community, the most persuasive argument will be the one that is 
comprehensible to the reader without prior knowledge.  This cannot 
be said about Koppelman’s work.  Admittedly, Koppelman offers 
his work as part of a discussion among legal theorists and political 
philosophers.  This requires a level of sophistication on the part of 
the reader, perhaps limiting its accessibility for many.   
Both authors published their book prior to the Court’s decision 
in Town of Greece.  Ironically, the Court’s decision demonstrates 
each theory well.  The majority opinion noted that the context and 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment shows that the Establishment 
Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer.  Such prayer 
created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion’s 
role in society.  The Court also distinguished between offense and 
coercion.19  The concurring opinion noted the long history of 
legislative prayer.20  Smith would probably support this outcome 
since it eschewed the requirement for neutrality and secular 
purpose; it supported the local community’s understanding of 
religion and its history; and did not violate the Establishment 
Clause’s prohibition on establishing or supporting a national 
church.  The Court’s reasoning looks more like the soft 
constitutionalism of the pre-Everson era. 
Koppelman would not support the Town of Greece decision.  
He might say that the nature of prayer itself and the sectarian 
character of the prayers at issue in the case suggest that government 
is declaring religious truth (prayer is good, Christianity is good), or 
at the very least lending support for religious truth.  In fact, he 
argues that Town of Greece’s predecessor case, Marsh v. Chambers, 
should be overruled as legislative prayer involved the government 
19. Town of Greece, 134 S.Ct. at 1826.
20. Id. at 1832-33 (Alito, J., concurring).
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in making a continual set of discretionary religious choices.21  As 
government is deciding a live religious debate, and there is no 
secular purpose, the principle of neutrality dictates the law to be 
overturned.22 
The discussion above should not suggest there are no 
weaknesses of Smith’s theory.  As attractive as it is, it begs the 
question of how the Court should return to soft constitutionalism. 
Perhaps the answer is allowing the Court to continue its erratic 
course of using different principles for each Establishment Clause 
case it decides.  This might seem to work, but a bit more formality 
may be preferable if Smith’s theory is adopted.  For instance, Smith 
notes that in the pre-Everson adjudication, the Court decided cases 
based on state law and avoided making declarations on what the 
First Amendment meant.  If the law is to return to that path, as Smith 
advocates, would this require the Court to avoid making any 
pronouncements on what the Constitution requires and instead 
make decisions solely based on political morality?  Further, would 
it necessitate the de-incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from the First Amendment so that state law and local 
understandings could be determinative?  Or is the alternative even 
starker—if the Court is to return to the jurisdictional argument, does 
it need to abstain from all such cases entirely, so that it would not 
agree to hear a case on legislative prayer or any other Establishment 
Clause issue because it lacks the necessary competence?  A little 
more direction from Smith would be beneficial.  Without any, it 
would seem Smith’s theory is one where the Court gives deference 
to the majority rule in which the religious understandings of a state 
or community is shaped by those with the most political power.  If 
this is the case, then it is not clear that religious minorities will face 
less oppression or feel any less alienated. 
Perhaps it is a bit naïve for any American, at this point in the 
nation’s history, to expect coherence and consistency in Supreme 
Court adjudication.  Both Koppelman and Smith demonstrate the 
difficulty in building a coherent approach to the Establishment 
Clause.  The country is moving towards a heightened level of 
religious pluralism as the number of people who do not affiliate 
with religion increases, while at the same time the number of 
monotheistic denominations and new religions grow as well.  The 
21. 463 U.S. 783 (1983); KOPPELMAN, supra note 4 at 76.
22. Id. 
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ability to define what constitutes religion and who is a religious 
believer becomes more difficult as time goes on.  Maybe it is just 
not possible to adopt one principle to be used for each and every 
case and instead, the best the Court can do is make case-by-case 
decisions based upon whatever principles seem most appropriate at 
that particular time.  In this sense, perhaps Smith is correct.  If all 
groups are losing, then all are winning.  This is not exactly 
satisfactory, but it may be the best that can be done.  At least this 
way, America’s first freedom is protected, even if the strength of 
that protection may occasionally rise or fall. 
